We develop a dual control method for approximating investment strategies in incomplete environments that emerge from the presence of market frictions. Convex duality enables the approximate technology to generate lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function.
Introduction
The impossibility to acquire closed-form solutions to a myriad of portfolio choice problems advocates the design of approximate methods. This failure to arrive at explicit expressions depends on the agent's preference qualifications and technical assumptions on the subject of undiversifiability in the financial environment, cf. Kim and Omberg (1996) , Wachter (2002) and Liu (2006) . To avoid this inability, we propose a dual control technique for approximating the dynamic asset allocation in markets that embed general trading constraints for an expansive set of preference conditions. The technology that we delineate in this article is tractable, for it finds its merits in closed-form expressions as to the portfolio composition that we collect through Malliavin calculus. We assess the accuracy of our approximating mechanism by means of a utility loss criterion, which emanates as a result of the available duality bounds. Convex martingale duality in relation to artificial markets namely enables us to provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function. Insignificant duality gaps and welfare losses varying between 1 and 5 basis points allude to near-optimality of the method.
Constrained consumption and portfolio choice problems are typically difficult to solve. Therefore, it is conventional to resort to an examination of their corresponding duals. In the influential papers by Karatzas et al. (1991a) , Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) , and Xu and Shreve (1992) the authors show that these primal and dual problems reconcile through a barrier cone which relates the choice of respectively a controlled allocation to assets to the market prices of risk. In fact, the dual problem induces a so-called fictitious economic environment, wherein the objective concerns minimization over the shadow prices of non-traded or partially traded uncertainty. Adequately minimizing the dual recovers the true market, couples via the cone the set of shadow prices to feasible and optimal decision rules, and ensures persistence of strong duality.
1 Despite that, the resultant shadow prices ordinarily outline backward-forward equations that do not permit analytical recovery of their solutions, making the call for approximation rampant.
In view of the notion that the inexistence of closed-form solutions to the optimal trading rules and consumption behaviour stems entirely from the backward-forward equations identifying the shadow prices, we confine the set of attainable dual controls to a tractable parametric family: deterministically constant or affine in the uncertainty, to name a few. Under this stricture regarding the set to which the shadow prices ought to conform, we are able to derive definite expressions for the controls that minimize the dual. Thereon, the analytical dual value function prompts an upper bound on the true one, on account of strong duality. The magnitude of the bound's deviation from the optimal value depends on the quality of the approximation inherent in the restriction of the set of feasible dual controls. In parallel, the approximate sub-optimal shadow prices give rise via the barrier cone to continuous consumption streams and investment behaviour that do not by definition comply with the trading constraints in the baseline financial market.
So as to obtain portfolio decisions that are admissible in the true economic environment, we turn to the primal side of the problem specification, and propose a construct for a candidate solution. In particular, the absence of arbitrage empowers us to express the wealth and consumption processes under some equivalent measure as local martingales, see Harrison and Kreps (1979) , Harrison and Pliska (1981) and Cox and Huang (1989) . Consequently, by the Martingale Representation Theorem (MRT), we are able to gather the optimal allocation of resources. The Clark-Ocone formula allows us under mild regularity conditions to explicitly identify the integrand in the MRT as a previsible projection of a generalised Fréchet derivative in the Wiener-direction, cf. Karatzas et al. (1991b) , Ocone and Karatzas (1991) , Nualart (2006), and Di Nunno et al. (2009) . Dependent on the delimitation of the set of shadow prices, the subsequently following dynamic allocation concurs up to the market prices with the infeasible one emerging from the dual side. We then project under a case-specific metric the portfolio decisions to the admissible region, whereby we retrieve closed-form approximations to the true strategies. Numerical maximization over the therein incorporated shadow prices yields the approximate analytical portfolio and engenders a lower bound on the optimal value function.
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The discrepancy between the lower and upper bounds arising from the primal and dual problems is the optimality gap and aids in quantifying the precision of the approximation. Concretely, this utilatirain difference translates itself into an annual welfare loss that grows with the level of inaccruacy of the approximation. In order to illustrate the authenticity of the technique, we cast the problem into Brennan and Xia (2002) 's incomplete economy (e.g. Battocchio and Menoncin (2004) , Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005) , Cairns et al. (2006) , Munk (2007) , De Jong (2008a) and De Jong (2008b) supply resembling economies), which accommodates unspanned inflation risk and inhabits a finite-horizon investor. Herein, we design and introduce the dual CRRA preference qualification, which describes the investor's utility. Thereby, we enlarge the framework to one that applies to state-dependent preferences. Resulting duality gaps and welfare losses are negligibly small.
The attributes that differentiate this study from the existing literature on approximate methods, e.g. Cvitanić et al. (2003) , Detemple et al. (2003) Brandt et al. (2005) , Keppo et al. (2007) , and Koijen et al. (2009) , which prominently employ the duality bounds and convex analysis in evaluating these, cf. Haugh et al. (2006) , Brown et al. (2010) , Brown and Smith (2011) , Bick et al. (2013) , and Ma et al. (2017) are threefold: (i) the inclusion of state-dependent preference qualifications, (ii) , the applicability in a set of markets that may comprise non-Markovian return dynamics, and (iii) the incorporation of general trading restrictions. Methodologically, Bick et al. (2013) come closest to our method of approximation. Their study involves a CRRA agent in a Markovian model, who receives labour income. Ignoring this endowment, we extend their mode by making it applicable outside of CRRA stipulations in markets that go beyond Markovian conditions.
Model Setup
This section introduces the economic setting by close analogy with the models in Brennan and Xia (2002) and Detemple and Rindisbacher (2009) . In the spirit of Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) , we generalise their economy with inclusion of trading constraints.
Financial Market Model
Define a horizon T > 0, and consider a probability space (Ω, F t , {F t } t∈ [0,T ] reads {F t } t∈ [0,T ] . 3 In the sequel, (in)equalities between stochastic processes are understood in a P-almost sure sense. The financial environment, say M, distinguishes a real and a nominal market and therefore includes a commodity price index, Π t , that harbours both W Here, the F t -measurable π t denotes the rate of inflation. Moreover, ξ
t -measurable for i = 1, 2. We assume that all three processes are in D 1,2 ([0, T ]), see Nualart (2006) .
Multiplying any asset with the reciprocal of Π t spawns its nominal value. Thereon,
characterizes the real pricing kernel, where r t defines the F t -measurable real interest rate,
t -measurable, and φ M 2 t is F t -measurable. Suppose that L t is some traded process, then L t Π −1 t M t t∈ [0,T ] must by construction be a P-martingale. As a consequence, the nominal state price density (SPD) process complies with dZ t = Z t −r t − π t + λ 1,t ξ
in which λ i,t = ξ
t , i = 1, 2, delineate the nominal market prices of risk, and where we let Z t := Π −1 t M t . We postulate that r t ∈ D 1,2 ([0, T ]) and φ t ∈ D 1,2 ([0, T ]) d+m given that φ t := φ
, securing Malliavin-differentiability of λ i,t , for i = 1, 2. Novikov's condition, cf. Sec 3.5.D in Karatzas and Shreve (1991) , thereby holds. From (2.3),
retains, signifying the identity for the instantaneous nominal interest rate.
The economic model accommodates an instantaneously risk-free asset, i.e. a money market account, and d + m non-dividend paying risky assets that evolve pursuant to
where diag σ
t that fulfill the strong non-degeneracy assumption ψ σ ] meeting (2.8) for which x t ∈ K is true dt ⊗ P-a.e.. We postulate that K contains the origin, and additionally define
For any ν t ∈ H A , we fictitiously complete the asset menu constituting the unconstrained artificial market. For that purpose, introduce the fictitious analogues of B t and S t :
(2.10) In this artificial model, say M ν , the nominal interest rate reads R f,t + δ ( ν t ), and the risk-premium on the d+m-dimensional synthetic risky assets S t changes into σ t λ t + σ
The inverse of U X in the X T -direction tallies with I : R + × R + → R such that U X (I (x, y) , y) = x for all y ∈ R + . We mandate that I and U are piecewise continuously differentiable, I, U ∈ PC (R + ; R), in both directions of X T and Π T .
7 Then, define
for x, y ∈ R + as the convex conjugate of U , which is likewise in PC (R + ; R). Ultimately, we suppose that U Y < 0, where U Y is U 's first derivative in the Π T -direction Regarding u, we enforce the same assumptions as on U . Moreover, u X and u XX denote the first and second derivatives of u in the first argument; u Y is u's first derivative in the demarcates the convex conjugate of e − t 0 βs u, resulting from sup z∈R + e − t 0 βs u (z, y) − xz , for x, y ∈ R + . We explicitly embed the price index into both utility specifications in the light of motives that relate to real wealth, cf. Brennan and Xia (2002) . Note that Π t is sufficiently general; applications including R + -valued semi-martingales are trivial.
Portfolio Choice
We advance by probing (2.15). Herein, we classify the problem into two cooperating ones according to the unconstrained market and the therein entrenched true economy. In order to envision the implications of convex duality, we first solve the portfolio choice problem in this unconstrained model. Afterwards, we activate the trading restrictions and apply martingale duality to recover the portfolio composition in its constrained counterpart. We finalize by clarifying the ramifications of the duality concepts for non-traded risk.
Allocation Unconstrained Market
We first explore (2.15) in the unconstrained market M. Drawing on the martingale method, cf. Pliska (1986) , Karatzas et al. (1987) , and Huang (1989, 1991) , we transform the dynamic problem in (2.15) into a static variational formulation as specified by
which is identical to the aforementioned dynamic stochastic optimal control problem, where ] lives by the nominal SPD in (2.3).
7 This description is in the mould of Detemple and Zapatero (1991) , whose generality we enlarge by relying on Lakner and Nygren (2006) 
In this reformulated static problem, the agent maximizes expected utility over all attainable or equitably admissible contingent claims that involve a continuous stream of coupon payments. Hereinafter, arbitrage arguments inclusive of the self-financing condition implicit in (2.7) facilitate us to recover {x t } t∈ [0,T ] , which hedges the investor against adverse shifts in the "underlyings" of X T and {c t } t∈ [0,T ] . In particular, denote by D W t the Malliavin derivative in the W t -direction, then Theorem A.1 states that
Further, the budget constraint in (3.1) ensures that {X t } t∈[0,T ] remains self-financing. The martingale modes that we exploit in solving (3.1) authorize us to circumvent the typical abridgement of the generality due to the assumption of a Markovian return structure in the financial model.
8 By virtue of the static nature of the problem in (3.1), we are then able to resort to Lagrangian technology on infinite-dimensional Banach spaces in order to rescue optimal horizon wealth, consumption patterns, and the harmonious portfolio decomposition. Theorem 3.1 embraces the ensuing optimal solutions to (3.1).
Theorem 3.1. Consider the portfolio choice problem (3.1) in the unconstrained market, for an investor with wealth dynamics (2.7). Then, optimal c t and X T materialize into
where
Additionally, H −1 (X 0 ) characterizes the multiplier, given the decreasing function H :
in which X 0 ∈ R + represents the fixed initial endowment: the budget constraint binds. The congruent optimal portfolio rules originate from the following identity 5) which is extricable by virtue of the MRT and uniqueness of the integrand in (3.2). 6) and 8) and analogously
, which verifies optimality of the pair X opt T , c opt t inherent in (3.7). Let us then advance by deriving the optimal portfolio rules. From the MRT,
(Ω) hence obeys. This carries over to u X (c t , Π t ).
Descrying the unconstrained M as the true economy, we break down Theorem 3.1. To erase the semblance of superfluity concerning the formulae in (3.3), we note that this theorem sheds light on the solution technique embroiling infinite-dimensional optimization. In applications of convex duality, this technique plays a prominent role. The formulae themselves constitute celebrated identities to which a copious strand of the literature has supplied economically intuitive implications; consider e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1998 
In specific, x opt t encases three distinct portfolio decisions that unfold themselves by computations along the lines of the decomposition manoeuvres in Detemple and Rindisbacher (2009) . The separation of these hedging demands submits to x 
See Merton (1969) for like weights in line with CRRA preferences. The remaining two demands are respectively price index and nominal deflator hedges that answer to
(3.13)
The expressions in (3.10) provoke the hedging coefficients within these portfolio weights, whereas the "R" terms are interdependent with quantities that categorize relative riskaversion (RRA). By partitioning the former identities into subgroups that share the same intrinsic character, we could disentangle more specific hedging motivations such as shadow price hedges or interest rate hedges, cf. Detemple (2014) for akin rules. As concerns the RRA factors, let us exemplify the matter for a ratio CRRA agent whose preferences obey U (x, y)
Presuming that utility from consumption respects an identical qualification, we straightforwardly find that R observe the similarities between the RRA structures, R 1 −1
There is no guarantee that this proximity surpasses this example; we generalise it as part of the demand concomitant inflation risk.
Assuming that U and u are such that R 1 −1
c,u c opt u Z u hold , the optimal portfolio composition x opt t in (3.5) transforms into 15) wherein the two-fund separation principle for c t 's RRA and X T 's RRA in isolation is preponderantly visible. Namely, we distinguish the two mutual funds on the basis of the the detached RRA fractions: R 
The requirements imposed on u and U under which the separation precept holds apply for instance to dual CRRA stipulations. In Brennan and Xia (2002) , the authors unravel this phenomenon in detail for a utility-maximizing CRRA investor. 
Application Convex Duality
This section applies convex martingale duality to the dynamic asset allocation problem in M, wherein we constrain {x t } t∈[0,T ] to A X 0 . We assemble the duality techniques in a style that is to a great extent inspired by Rogers (2001) , for the sake of merging the primal with the dual. We relegate explicit optimality statements to the next section. Now, consider an agent in the baseline economic environment M from section 2.1, whose wealth dynamics accommodate general investment restrictions through K. Therefore, (3.16) for given X 0 ∈ R + details the constrained portfolio choice problem. The martingale method fails to render a static problem tantamount to (3.1), due to the presence of these constraints. Notwithstanding, after applying duality modes, the resulting dual implies the fictitious market M ν , in which a static unconstrained problem surfaces.
For purposes that facilitate applications of duality, we rework the dynamic constraint:
The exogenous money market account B t in this numéraire-based approach does not influence the optimality conditions, cf. the monograph by Rogers (2013) . In the wake of the aforestated study, we then introduce a strictly positive semi-martingale process 
12
Alternatively, we could enforce Y T on the rewritten dynamic constraint (3.17) as a Lagrange multiplier in the ordinary fashion. Therewith, we arrive in expectation at 
, reliant on the Hermitian adjoint operator of the Malliavin kernel. This approach is effectively identical to the techniques applied in Rogers (2001) as well as in (3.18), and emphasizes the integration by parts recipe. Let us then turn to the duality results based on this Lagrange multiplier procedure, as subsequently set out in Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the constrained dynamic allocation problem in (3.16). Introduce 20) for some unspecified Y 0 ∈ R + , where (3.22) 12 In the posterior Theorem 3.2, the semi-martingale Y t finds its technically precise definition. Observe that if we pursue along these lines in the unconstrained environment M, we obtain
where v, V : (3.23) in which the optimal Lagrange multiplier is obtainable from the next equality
F t , and the subsequent
holds, implying that Y
T Y T , induces the SPD in the constrained baseline market M.
Proof. We follow Klein and Rogers (2007) in applying convexity techniques. In this regard, let us introduce the Lagrangian for problem (3.16) and rewrite it by Itô's Lemma:
, which procure the optimality conditions in (3.23).
13 We refer to the proof of Theorem 3.1 for analogous identities (FOC's) involving Fréchet derivatives 
after optimizing over {x t } t∈[0,T ] ∈ A X 0 . CS then engenders (3.21) and (3.26). Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) show that β opt t ensures x opt t ∈ A X 0 . By Theorem A.1: (3.30) in which D W t R f,s for s ≥ t is given in Theorem 3.1. Further, all R 2 terms are equivalent to the R 2 terms with inclusion of (3.23) rather than (3.3). Accordingly,
14 The anterior theorem reveals two paramount facets that lay the groundwork for the approximate method: (i) the existence of an artificial market, in which by construction the encapsulated objective function supplies an upper bound on the true value function, and (ii) the generic FOC's essential to this artificial market that succeed to ensure optimality in the constrained baseline M. In the interest of the two aspects, let us turn to a full elucidation of M ν by conciliating the results in Theorem 3.2 with the conceptualization of the fictitious market in section 2.2 according to Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) . Apurpose, parametrize β t as
The drift term α Y,t encircled within Y t thus alters into the negative counterpart of the support function in M ν , such that the corresponding barrier cone changes as well into the analogue of M ν , see (2.9). Similarly, the set of feasible dual controls
is acquirable similar to H −1 (X 0 ) in Theorem 3.1, and " " denotes the Hadamard product. 
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In the artificial market, the investor is unconstrained with regard to the choice of portfolio rules { x t } t∈ [0,T ] , effecting that the martingale method is applicable. Hence,
characterizes the fictitious static duplicate of the primal problem in (3.16), where X ν T is the terminal value of synthetic wealth in (2.12), { c t } t∈[0,T ] the fictitious consumption behaviour,
t , and ν t ∈ H A is left unspecified. As a consequence, optimal fictitious horizon wealth and consumption respectively live by X in (3.31), and the Lagrange multiplier η opt ∈ R + is such that the static constraint binds.
T , Π T , and η ν ∈ R + be such that the budget constraint (3.33) binds. Then, the specification in (3.22) is identical to
Inserting X ν,opt T and c opt t into the fictitious value function thus recovers the dual objective in Theorem 3.2. As a result, the dual objective harmonizes with opting for the worst-case fictitious market. Similarly, for any ν t ∈ H A , the objective in (3.33) supplies an upper bound on (3.22), implying that the dual coincides with selecting the lowest possible upper bound. By strong duality, this least-favourable choice rallies the constrained baseline financial market M, wherein c opt t , x opt t meet the admissibility requirements enclosed by A X 0 . The link between ν t and the economic scenarios is evident from the SPD (2.11).
Optimality Incomplete Markets
This section concludes by illustrating the main findings in Theorem 3.2 for the case of non-traded risk. We use a terminal wealth framework that mildly adjusts the economic ] in the fictitious M ν may therefore not be admissible in M for every ν t ∈ H A . setting in section 2. Herewith, we aim to expound the benefit of an approximate method. To accomplish which, reconsider M, set σ
, and restrict S t to its first d entries such that solely W 1 t is driving S t . Moreover, we impose a trading restriction through
t is not traded.
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In the fictitious M ν , the support function and barrier cone change into δ (
The artificial non-traded asset abides by 
To alleviate notation, let us separate x t as x t = [x t , x f,t ] , in which x t is the allocation to S t in the true market M and x f,t the proportion of wealth invested in D t . Then, 36) describes the artificial wealth process, where we let λ 2,t = λ 2,t + σ S 2 t −1 ν 2,t for brevity.
Additionally, we suppress inclusion of a consumption process, inasmuch as we confine the analysis to an investor who derives utility from solely horizon wealth, for the sake of lucidity. Admissibility of x t in the artificial market M ν inherits its definition from (2.13). Note that admissibility in the constrained environment M holds only if x f,t = 0 m . Ultimately, we observe that the fictitious dynamic allocation problem reads as
In application to the previous setting, we proceed by breaking down Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 into three propositions. The first proposition concerns optimality in the artificial environment M ν . The second proposition poses the dual problem along with restrictions invoked on the the multiplier process. The last proposition retains optimality in M.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the problem in (3.37). Then, optimal horizon wealth follows
where η opt := H −1 (X 0 ) characterizes the multiplier. 18 The optimal portfolio rises from
Then, define the previsible projections of transformed RRA (proxies) as
40)
where we abbreviate R
The hedging coefficients in optimal x opt t are given λ f,t = λ 1,t , λ 2,t equal to
. Hence, x opt t springs from the analytic for x opt f,t : replace σ 
19
Proof. The results and corresponding proof emanate trivially from Theorem 3.1. Proposition 3.3 summarizes the optimal solutions to the fictitious terminal wealth problem in (3.37), which amounts to showcasing an adjusted version of combined elements that establish Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. By implication, the interpretation of results roughly shadows those of the latter two. There are, however, three aspects that are different in view of the artificial market M ν incorporating the unspecified shadow prices ν t ∈ H A : (i) the optimal controls that explicitly depend on ν 2,t , (ii) an altered decomposition as in (3.13), and (iii) the dormant existence of a ν 2,t such that x opt f,t = 0 m . As to item (i):
18 Here, H :
Replacing the terms in parentheses for G 1 t,T and G 2 t,T in (3.42) by respectively (
shows reminiscent of (3.12) that the optimal portfolio decisions depend on the measure Q ν that induces in conjunction with B t in M ν the SPD. Endogeneity of ν 2,t underpinning the non-unicity of this measure Q ν demonstrates that x opt t is subject to a potentially preference-specific input. The indefinite shadow prices ν 2,t thus also enjoy the power to alter x opt f,t . The dual problem employs this quality to effectuate x opt f,t = 0 m .
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In reference to item (ii), we imitate the decomposition procedure applied to acquire (3.13), which commands that x opt t is detachable as 44) are respectively fictitious nominal stochastic deflator and commodity price hedges. The first rule concerns the ordinary tangency mean-variance efficient portfolio
The shadow prices ν 2,t affect all three disentangled portfolio demands, due to the fact that ] , and so do the (previsible) RRA coefficients.
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Lastly, taking note of λ 2,t 's endogenity, or coequally ν 2,t 's endogeneity, within the expression (3.41) of Proposition 3.3 for x opt t , we find that the next identity for λ 2,t
gratifies according to (3.41) to repeal any allocation to D t : contingent on ν 2,t obeying (3.45), x opt f,t = 0 m holds. Note that the RHS of the latter equality may ingrain { λ 2,t } t∈[0,T ] , instigating non-linearity into (3.45). In general, the expression for λ 2,t therefore designates a full backward-forward equation, see Detemple (2014) for similar arguments. As this approach towards collecting λ 2,t is provisional, we next turn to the duality concepts.
Proposition 3.4. Consider the constrained analogue of the portfolio choice problem in (3.37) in the baseline market M. Introduce a strictly positive martingale process
for some Lagrange multiplier Y 0 ∈ R + , where β 1,t = φ
Then, the following inequality holds for any x t s.t.
In the third proposition, we show that minimizing the dual -choosing the least-favourable fictitious completion M ν among all feasible ν t ∈ H A -indeed ensures x opt f,t = 0 m such that x opt t ∈ A X0 . 21 Cognate to x t = [x t , x f,t ] , the three demands separate into a fictitious "x f,t " part and a true "x t " part. Changing the Malliavin kernel to D where V denotes U 's convex conjugate. Consequently, the dual variant of the unconstrained dynamic asset allocation problem unfolds itself in the following fashion
In addition to that, because x t = 0 d is feasible, strong duality persists:
Suppose that β solve (3.48). Then, optimal terminal wealth complies with
Complementary slackness alternatively commands that
indicating that
Proof. The proof for this proposition arises out of the one for Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3.4 encompasses in conformity with the results in Theorem 3.2 the dual problem corresponding to its primal congener, which is essential to the fictitious specification in (3.37). In effect, the artificial market is a by-product of the dual concretization and assists in reconciling the baseline constrained market M with this fictitious economy M ν . Consistent with Theorem 3.2, in the present case, M ν finds its definition from the CS condition (3.50) via which Y −1 0 Y t = dQ ν /dP| Ft ought to be true. Hence, with due regard for the numéraire-based avenue in (3.17), the dual implicates minimization over
for unspecified ν t ∈ H A , which confirms that the dual objective unifies itself with opting for a probability measure in an effort to malignly affect utility levels and therewith to make trades in D t utmost unappealing. The choice for this pricing measure namely acts via λ 2,t t∈[0,T ] purely upon the pricing of non-traded uncertainty {W 52) 23 The CS condition β t = − λ f,t descends from the fact that x t ∈ R d dt ⊗ P-a.e., which mandates {Y t } t∈[0,T ] to operate as for Lagrange multiplier η := Y 0 , unwinds a substitute for the dual in (3.48), underlining the separability of the controllable Radon-Nikodym derivative from the effectively exogenous nominal interest rate.
24 Assume that Q
defines the analogue of the pricing kernel M T under x f,t = 0 m . Hence, whilst R f,t remains exogenous, r t in the constrained market M contours ex-post an effectively endogenous process.
Lastly, let us conducive to the approximating dual control mechanism derive that
m is closed and convex. This inequality ascertains that the repression
m to P begets an upper bound on the optimal value function in virtue of (3.47) and strong duality (3.49). In the same way, the restriction to P may procreate a lower bound in the primal problem. 25 Combining these two outcomes, contraction of
m raises lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function.
We complete the exposition of this theoretical example by solving the dual (3.52). In light of this, let W β 2,t ,
m × R + is the unconstrained objective in consonance with (3.52), φ t and β 2,t are such that φ t , β 2,t + φ t ∈ D 1,2 ([0, T ]) m , and V X denotes the derivative of V in its fist argument. Further, we let O denote the Landau function. Then, ∆W describes the effect on W due to a small perturbation φ t on β 2,t . Applying the argument that small perturbations around the optimal controls must have insignificant effects on W, setting ∆W equal to zero recovers the optimal β 2,t . 26 We formalize this in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5. Consider the dual optimization problem (3.48) in compliance with the fictitious specification (3.37) for the optimal allocation to assets. Then,
itemizes an equality wherefrom we can extract λ opt 2,t that optimizes the dual. Further,
24 Observe that (3.52) lines as in (3.34) up with choosing the least-favourable completion. 25 The set A X0 reduces to one that complies with all λ 2,t ∈ P. The investor is accordingly incapable of optimally protecting him-or herself against injurious shifts in W 2 t t∈ [0,T ] , implying such a lower bound. 26 We interchangeably use β 2,t and − λ 2,t as well as Z qualifies the identity from which we are able to distil the unique multiplier η opt = Y 0 = H −1 (X 0 ). The optimal portfolio rules concerning the allocation to S t obey to 
characterizes the identity for the stochastic deflator hedge, and where
defines the equality from where we deduce the commodity price hedge; x m,opt t = R 2 t −1 σ
λ 1,t spells out the mean-variance portfolio. More, the hedging coefficients read
provoking the portfolio rules in (3.57), where D
Proof. Reconsider the objective function in (3.48), delimited by W :
The foregoing specifies the Fréchet derivative and ought to equal 0. We simplify
where we use X opt T
T Y T , and the Hermitian adjoint result. As a 27 We employ the definitions for R 1 t and R 2 t along with R 1 t,T and R 2 t,T from Proposition 3.3. 28 Optimality of λ f,t depends on K's definition and is thus case-specific, whence we provide the proof.
is both feasible and optimal in the constrained market M, attributable to strong duality (3.49).
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The aforestated theorem extricates two ingredients in connection with optimal solutions to the constrained utility maximization problem in M: (i) the choice for ν 2,t so that the allocation to D t abrogates in Proposition 3.3, and (ii) the optimality criteria imposed on the primal controls x t and X T that accede with this expression for ν opt 2,t . As for the former item, we note that the optimal shadow prices ν opt 2,t result from accurately minimizing the dual. Moreover, its equivalence with (3.45) is unambiguous. As to the last element, we observe in consideration of (3.37) that the static problem in M defers to
(3.65)
The preceding three propositions place a strong emphasis on the linking nature of the dual between the constrained primal problem in M and the unconstrained fictitious specification in M ν for the case of non-traded risk.
31 In particular, for each choice of ν t ∈ H A , we acquire by means of the dual an artificial market that assigns an upper bound to the optimal value function. Adequately minimizing the dual, i.e. choosing the least advantageous M ν or the smallest upper bound, then recovers a shadow price that induces optimality in the constrained M. It is, however, in general arduous to analytically obtain this price, cf. (3.45). Therefore, we subsequently outline an approximate method.
Approximate Method
This section develops our dual control framework for approximating trading strategies. We cultivate the technique on the grounds of the economic setup in section 2. To surmount 29 Principally, Proposition 3.5 develops from inserting x opt t t∈ [0,T ] into Proposition 3.3. 30 Employing the solution techniques from Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.3 yields Proposition 3.5. 31 For restrictions that differ from K = R d × {0} m , consider for instance Cuoco (1997) or Tepla (2000) .
the typical absence of closed-form expressions in Theorem 3.2, we confine the space of feasible β t to some closed and convex set. 32 The procedure then resides in the information that this theorem environs, such that an analytical approximation to the truly optimal investment decisions may result. Duality principles spawn lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function, accrediting us to gauge the method's accuracy. We append the blueprint of the approximate method with an example linked to section 3.3.
Projection Feasible Strategies
We commence with the description of the method by underscoring that its substructure consists in a twofold procedure. That is, we first cage the set of dual controls β t to a closed and convex set,
n , which makes up the cornerstone that invigorates the technique at the outset, cf. the analysis around (3.45). Second, we prescribe a projection operator commensurate with a case-dependent metric that casts the infeasible dual-optimal portfolio rules into the pre-specified feasible region A X 0 that concurs with the limited space of controls P. The inequality that lies at the root of this method is
comprehends all admissible strategies that comport with ∈ P, which betokens that the anomaly from the optimal value function, say J opt , as regards J L and J U alternates with the efficacy of the approximation to β t .
Convex duality in combination with the contraction of shadow prices to P breaks as reported by Theorem 3.2 in general down when it comes to assuring that { x t , c t } t∈[0,T ] ∈ A P X 0 . To overstep the consequential analytical impossibility of solving the LHS of (4.1), we approximate terminal wealth X opt T and the congruous consumption streams c opt t
where we let
be the projection kernel tallying with an operator that maps any n-dimensional state-wise square-integrable investment plan to the region of admissible trading strategies {x t } t∈ [0,T ] ∩ P and Y 0 ∈ R + . We next endeavour to compensate for remaining inaccuracies by "pruning" x opt t | βt∈H P A ∩P towards an identity that meets the admissibility criteria with the help of the projection operator.
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The preceding method administers an admissible and consequently a budget-feasible pair proj A P X 0
for any β t ∈ H P A ∩ P. So as to determine β t , consider
which delimits under X * T in (4.2) the smallest duality gap affiliated with the circumscription to P, where we separate the unspecified approximate controls on the primal side θ
. More, we let J L be the primal value function that ensues after insertion of proj A P X 0
. This quantification of the smallest duality gap contingent on the outlined approximation underpins the notion that the approximate rules lodge apart from the undetermined shadow prices also the undefined Lagrange multipliers. The approximations to the portfolio rules and consumption streams by respectively proj A P 
and c
, formulates an alternative approximation to X opt T and c opt t that is fully analytical. Herewith, the approximation to the optimal rules authorizes us in a meaningful manner -dependent on the quality of the approximation to β opt t interlaced with the repression to P -to detour all possible numerical effort involved in optimizing the primal objective J L . We base the suitability as concerns the immediate injection of the analytically obtainable dual controls approximate primal and dual parameters accompany trifling optimality gaps. The exceptional instances in which the duality gap depletes to zero are when the restricted set P cleaves with the truly optimal shadow prices β t , or when we let P coincide with the original set
> 0 is true. Hence, to make the size of the duality gap tangible for both types of approximations in (4.2) and (4.4), we compute the so-called compensating variation. To that end, we examine
wherein we let J L,opt be the primal objective in (4.3) resulting from either of the two approximate modes, corresponding to the initial endowment X 0 ∈ R + . Here, we denote the compensating variation by CV ∈ R + . The aforesaid quantity defines the amount of capital that one must add to X 0 in order to overpass
. Economically, the magnitude of CV translates the utilitarian loss incurred due to the approximation into a monetary loss. The annual equivalent, CV 
Stepwise Approximating Routine
We proceed by describing the approximate method for
n in terms of a stepwise routine involving Monte Carlo. Although the previous approximations to x opt t accommodated in Theorem 3.2 are fully analytical, the approximate objective J L,opt typically does not induce a closed-form formula. Considering further probable practical purposes, we amplify the routine. We first discuss some necessary notation and interconnected features. Let us rewrite the equality for approximate wealth, (4.2) or (4.4), as follows
t is the approximation to x opt t . Hereby, we ensure that X * t > 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and eliminate the dependency on X * T T =t , which would elseways discommode simulations. Note that X *
F t in Theorem 3.2, and that c P,opt t restores post-factum from c * t X * t . Bearing these facts in mind, we continue with the description of the method.
Step 1. Initialization of method. We initialize some N ∈ N denoting the number of paths for {W t } t∈ [0,T ] . Thereby, we discretize Ω into ω i ∈ Ω for i = 1, . . . , N . Similarly, we fix an M ∈ N representing W t 's number of time increments on [0, T ]. That is, we partition [0, T ] into M equidistant intervals as 0 = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t M = T such that |t i − t i−1 | = T /M for i ≥ 0. Conclusively, one may employ finite-difference methods to simulate the state variables according to the sample space induced by N × M .
Step 2. Wealth dynamics. Afterwards, we unscramble X * T subsuming the approximate x * t and c * t . Therefrom, we simulate the finite-difference analogue of the completely analytical log (X * T ) in (4.6). The posterior process is equipped with unspecified θ L, * t . We endow state-dependent processes with ω j -notation. Approximate X * T then agrees with
for j = 1, . . . , N , where
complies with the approximating portfolio weights implicit in either proj A P X 0
We simulate the log of X * T so as to safeguard X * T > 0, cf. (4.6). The (former) rules' discrete duplicatesx * t i depend on the unspecified θ L, * t , and follow from equation (3.31), as (non-)linear transformations of the state variables. More, X * tn results from taking the sums in (4.7) up to n = 1, . . . , M .
Step 3. Shadow price and multiplier. We then continue with optimally determining the approximate shadow prices β L, * t and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier
In particular, we employ standard optimization software to maximize the lower bound on J opt engendered by the following primal value function
The unavailability of closed-form formulae in addition to analytically insuperable FOC's stimulates the usage of such numerical algorithms. Running times depend on the routine, and are as a result uninformative. Clearly, we assume at this point that we are in possession of X * tn for each n = 1, . . . , M . Simulating this X * tn is considered part of step 2. Notice that step 3 applies solely to proj A P X 0 x opt t . Hence:
• In case of proj A P 
37
Step 4. Performance evaluation. The final step consists in evaluating the per-
where J U and J L,opt are respectively the approximate analytical dual and approximate estimated primal value functions. To recover CV, apply numerically facile root-finding modes to
wherein we search over all CV ∈ R + such that this equality holds. Observe that CV ∈ R + is unique, because it linearly enacts on X * T and c * tn that are both encompassed within the strictly increasing utility functions u and U . Moreover, the LHS of this equation comprises the optimal β L, * t and Y L, * 0 from step 3 of the routine. This last step is obviously superfluous in light of the technique; it exclusively serves to measure the precision.
We construe the stepwise approximating routine under the presumption that the dual side of the problem renders analytical expressions for the dual controls θ U, * and the upper value function J U . However, these expressions are absent in Theorem 3.2, since the dual requires a full elucidation of K ⊆ R d+m before it deciphers FOC's for the (approximate) dual controls θ U, *
t . An application analogous to step 3 on the dual side discharges this postulate, and engenders estimates to θ U, * and J U that we may employ in steps 3/4.
Approximation Incomplete Markets
This section finalizes the analysis of the approximating procedure by casting the subject into the context of the economic setup and problem specification of section 3.3. Recall that the set of restrictions in that environment lives by
m define the spaces in reference to β t . In the sequent analysis, we let 
The residual numerical effort involved with this approximate rule is due to steps 1 and 4.
Step 4's running time is redundant. That of step 1 differs e.g. with dimensionality, see Detemple et al. (2006) . 37 In the description, we use c P,opt t . Replacing this approximation by c
only has an effect on step 3.
where we take advantage of
The confinement marked by P hence effectively insures that the dual controls β U, * 2,t are only allowed to attain values on the real line R m . By this regulation, we aspire to approximate β opt 2,t = − λ opt 2,t in (3.55) of Proposition 3.5 by a constant in an attempt to evade the computational strain enmeshed with solving its backward-forward equation, in a simple way.
38
On the dual side, we are able to amass an analytic for optimal β U, * 2,t . In specific, (4.11) describes the FOC to the approximate dual (4.10) in the β U, * 2,t -direction, where we let W be the objective function in (4.10). Resultantly, the optimal approximate dual control must adhere to β U, *
, which is equal to the true FOC in Proposition 3.5 for β opt 2,t at its initialization point in time t = 0. In a like fashion, the FOC for the corresponding approximate dual multiplier Y U, * 0 rises from the equality
urges an analytical system of two (non-linear) equations that we are able to solve for the approximate dual shadow price β U, * 2,t and reciprocal Lagrange multiplier Y U, * 0 . In tandem with both preceding dual controls included in θ U, * t , the approximate dual objective function J U (X 0 ) finds its definition in closed-form. The dual side of the method is on this account characterized by closed-form expressions for the controls and value function.
Let us now turn to the primal side. For that purpose, consider x opt t in Proposition 3.3 along with the artificial wealth equation in (3.36). We transform this wealth process into an admissible analogue by suppressing the dependency on x f,t , which then leads to
(4.13)
Here, x opt, * t contains the first d analytical entries of x opt t in (3.39) for undefined β t . This enforcement of the trading constraint guarantees feasibility of X * t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T . However, we cannot analytically determine the β t that optimizes expected utility for these wealth dynamics. For tractability with regard to numerically determining this β t , we confine the set to of admissible β t to all H P A ∩ P, for P as used in (4.10), such that β 1,t = −λ 1,t and
m . This approach coheres with the description in section 4.1 under 14) which dictates that x f,t = 0 m . Considering that the actual optimal portfolio weights x opt t in the baseline constrained environment M, as given in Proposition 3.5, consist of x opt t including β opt t whereon x f,t = 0 m is imposed, this projection pertaining to P is plausible.
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At this stage, the procedure is identical for proj A P ∈ A X 0 . These rules sprout from from the system motivated by (4.12) and insert these into x opt, * t for full identification. In both cases, J L,opt follows through (4.8). In x opt, * t , we recognize in the shape of (3.44) three portfolio demands submitting to λ 1,t . These hedging demands are up to the RRA coefficients that incorporate deterministic constants for the shadow prices of non-traded risk equivalent to those presented in Proposition 3.3: we empower the R terms with an asterisk to refine the difference from the true expressions. Therewithal, observe that D
t λ 1,t , 0 d×m , which connotes the deterministic character and the total independence from W 2 t of the approximate shadow prices.
Numerical Illustration
We complete the examination of the approximate method with a numerical analysis that aspires to appraise the accuracy of the technique in an explicit economic framework that 39 The projection is case-dependent; e.g. in respect of borrowing and short-sale constraints, cf. Tepla (2000) , i.e. K = x ∈ R n + | x 1 n ≤ 1 , a reasonable projection would be proj A P X 0 Figure 1 . Isoelastic and dual CRRA utility. The graph depicts the utility development for an isoelastic agent and a dual CRRA agent. The matching risk-profiles adhere to γ = 5 and (γ d , γ u ) = (10, 2) for the (resp.) CRRA and dual CRRA investors. The reference level for the dual CRRA individual reads K = 1 (vertically dotted line). At K = 1, this individual draws zero utility, U = 0 (horizontally dotted line). Down-states of the world tally with ω ∈ Ω wherein X T /Π T ≤ K. Conversely, all ω ∈ Ω in which X T /Π T > K coincide with the economic up-states, as separated by the vertically dotted line K = 1.
involves a definite problem setup. With this in view together with the antecedent scrutiny of the incomplete markets setting, we discuss results in the environment of Brennan and Xia (2002) . 40 At the heart of this illustration lies our dual CRRA utility function, which constitutes a novel addition to the existing body of state-dependent preference conditions. This qualification replaces the CRRA function in the economic outline at hand.
Dual CRRA Utility Function
We suppose that the agent from section 3.3 has in mind some benchmark, K ∈ R + , regarding his/her horizon purchasing power, X T /Π T . For states in which X T /Π T ≤ K, the agent draws proportionately less utility than in reversed states. Therefore, we attach K to U , on account of which the dual CRRA function incorporates two isoelastic qualifications
for coefficients of risk-aversion γ d , γ u ∈ R + \ [0, 1] to forgo infinite utility, cf. Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) . In order to convene (5.1) with the portrayed situation, we dictate that γ d ≥ γ u . Hereby, we invoke that down-states correspond with an enhanced apprehension touching the attainment with reference to the exogenous K. 41 The investor under study retains total flexibility as to choosing K ante initium, before t = 0, resulting in K being fundamentally exogenous over the full course of [0, T ]. Without loss of generality, we normalize K = 1, such that U K | K=1 := U coalesces with the desires of an individual who covets to maintain a constant degree of purchasing power.
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Technically, we observe that U (X T , Π T ) is continuous at X T = Π T and state-dependent by virtue of the accommodated separation of instances. Furthermore, we find that
define respectively marginal utility in the first argument and its inverse, both of which are continuous at X T = Π T as well. The second derivative of U in the first argument, U XX , follows straightforwardly. Note that U satisfies once continuous differentiability in the X T -direction. Further, the inverse of marginal utility is piecewise continuously differentiable with a single breakpoint at X T = Π T . The mathematical description of the dual CRRA stipulation thence aligns with section 2.3's. Finally, the installment of two CRRA utilities in (5.1) occasions a qualification that displays non-constant RRA:
In Figure 1 , we exemplify the evolution of dual CRRA preferences, characterized by γ d = 10 and γ u = 2, jointly with those for a CRRA agent, rising from γ d = γ u = 5 in (5.1).
The discrepancy between the trajectories displays itself in a salient tone for the dual CRRA individual by a comparatively intensified utility development in "up-states" (X T /Π T > K) and a relatively abated progress in "down-states" (X T Π T ≤ K) of the function. Thus, this utility-maximizing investor is indispensably concerned about achieving K in down-states, whereas the same individual substantially loosens his/her anxiety in up-states.
] subject to the dynamic constraint implicit in (3.36) for an investor with dual CRRA preferences (5.1). Then,
i ∈ S := {d, u}. The appurtenant pevisible RRA transformation then must follow
, where 
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Proof. The statements and associated proof rise effortlessly from Proposition 3.5.
Corollary 5.1 carries the expressions that institute the optimality conditions in step with Proposition 3.5 for a dual CRRA agent (5.1). Note that closed-form expressions for the optimal portfolio x opt t and the market fair value of wealth X opt t are hereupon readily obtainable. The previous corollary chiefly discloses the analytical burden that may arise with regard to a recuperation of the optimal shadow prices of non-traded risk. Let us actualize this mathematical distress by inspecting the next expression 6) which typifies the identity from which we can evoke the shadow prices, where we use
The probability weights each depend on M T and non-linearly shelter { λ opt 2,t } t∈ [0,T ] . This path-dependency epitomizes that a closed-form expression for λ opt 2,t is not attainable. Withal, λ opt 2,t is restricted to an interval that diverges with the variation between γ d and γ u .
45 Therefrom, approving that P = R m may provide a level-headed approximation to λ opt 2,t for tenable γ d , γ u . Letting γ := γ d = γ u recovers the standard isoelastic framework and furnishes
wherefrom we infer that the shadow prices still mark off troublesome wholly forwardbackward equations, impelled by the fictitious hedging coefficients G 2 t,T and G 1 t,T . As a result, the latter equality does not allow us to withdraw λ opt 2,t in closed-form. Under the supplementary premises that π t and r t are F W 1 t -measurable, and that ξ Π 2 t defines a constant, as in for example Brennan and Xia (2002) , the optimal shadow prices would characterize constants as well: λ opt 2,t = (1 − γ) ξ Π 2 t . Whence, the optimal decisions x opt t explicitly implant the two-fund separation principle, and thereby break down into 
Up-States
Proportion of Wealth
Figure 2. Optimal allocation to stock. The figure depicts the optimal portfolio demand in relation to real wealth. To that end, the plot relies on a reduced economic setting for a dual CRRA agent characterized by (γ d , γ u ) = (10, 2) and a reference level K = 1 (vertically dotted line). This reduced economy contains a one-dimensional stock, for λ 1,t = 0.343 and σ S1 t = 0.158, wherein r t = π t = 0 and Π t = 1, so that X t /Π t effectively reads X t . Further, we set T = 1. Corollary 5.1's statements suffice to derive the optimality conditions. Here, γ d −1 λ 1,t /σ S1 t and γ u −1 λ 1,t /σ t S1 define (resp.) the portfolio decisions' floor and cap. in an economy wherein the exclusive risky asset abides by one-dimensional S t that embeds a constant appreciation rate and volatility coefficient. The plot appertains to an agent, personified by γ d = 10 and γ u = 2. We provide the allocation in relation to X t /Π t deducible from
All curves in this plot exhibit an interpolating design between the floor and cap around K = 1, resembling shifts from prudent to less cautious investment behaviour in line with Figure 1 . 47 Following the payoff of a European option, the cutoff points approach K = 1 for t → T , as the investor's concerns and harmonious rapid anticipation increase towards the planning horizon. The decisions indeed show trend-chasing behaviour, cf. Basak (2002) . Akin, though "fuzzier", shapes apply to the more general multi-dimensional instances.
Brennan and Xia Environment
In furtherance of the numerical illustration that corroborates precision of the approximate technique and relies on Brennan and Xia (2002) 's economic environment, we introduce their model setup and pose congruent approximate optimality conditions in the spirit of section 4. To align notation, we preserve the probabilistic schema in section 2.1, wherein we replace
as two single-factor Vasicek processes for respectively the instantaneous real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. We assume that that the therein assimilated parameters live by the typical definitions. These processes unequivocally meet the regularity conditions imposed on r t , π t in the generic financial model construction of section 2.1. Specifically, identify the R 3 -valued standard Brownian motion as
Hence, z u,t constitutes an undiversifiable source of risk. Correspondingly, inaugurate 12) as the simplified price index and real SPD, where ξ = [ξ s , ξ r , ξ π ] ∈ R 3 and φ =
[φ s , φ r , φ π ] ∈ R 3 characterize the constant factor loadings on z t . In agreement with these dynamics, we let dZ
The CRRA exposures
t ) −1 λ 1,t do not always provoke the floors and caps of
in the economy of Figure 2 . In the limit, the portfolio, however, converges to these extrema.
represents the artificial nominal SPD, for an endogenous λ u,t ∈ D 1,2 ([0, T ]). Here, z t is independent from z u,t and internally dependent, implied by the correlation matrix ρ ∈ [−1, 1] 3×3 , whose rows equate to (1, ρ s,r , ρ sπ ),(ρ sr , 1, ρ sπ ), (ρ sπ , ρ s,r , 1).
The actual nominal pricing kernel surfaces from Z t = M t /Π t and in part urges the nominal rate R f,t = r t + π t − ξ λ − ξ u λ u . The asset menu 48 then consists of
which respectively expound a stock, and two nominal bonds that differ on account of two times to maturity T i ∈ R + , i = 1, 2. In these stochastic differential equations, we define
for notational appliance. Moreover, the market construction mandates that the constant prices of financial risk obey λ = [λ s , λ r , λ π ] = ρ (ξ − φ) and λ u = ξ u − φ u . At last, we introduce the following two dynamic processes given that Λ t = Σ t λ:
(5.14)
The first process constitutes the agent's wealth dynamics, where we define x t as the R 3 -valued F t -measurable vector containing the proportions of X t that the agent allocates to the risky instruments. Herein, we assume that the portfolio weights satisfy
, where Σ t ∈ R 3×3 accommodates the securities' loadings on z t . Admissibility of x t holds, if additionally X t ≥ 0. The second process composes the fictitious asset, to which x u,t of X t is allocated. Admissibility of x u,t follows evenly from that of x t .
Approximate Optimality Dual
First, we analyse the approximate dual side of the terminal wealth problem in the previous economy. For that purpose, consider Proposition 3.3 and curtail the space of feasible dual controls λ u,
. We intuitively verify this repression of the space in the sequel. Tantamount to the results in section 4.3, this operation makes sure that the dual problem generates analytical solutions, which gives rise to Corollary 5.2. 15) 48 The nominal bonds crop up as a consequence of the construction:
Observe that we also include dB t = R f,t B t dt, B 0 = 1 in addition to S t and P i,t as part of the asset mix.
49 In what follows, we denote by N (·) the CDF of a univariate standard normal random variable.
for φ = φ, − λ 1 t,T = −ξ u and observe that G 2 t,T represents a previsible process, which pursuant to Corollary 5.1 quarters { λ
Let us recall that the parameter φ x,T analogously encircle integral representations enveloping λ opt u,t , for any γ d = γ u . As a consequence, the possibly non-linear dependency of G 2 t,T on the entire paths of the shadow price is indisputable. In virtue of the results in Corollary 5.1, the analytical identity from which we may restore the truly optimal shadow price λ opt u,t thereupon follows similarly from (5.6) and ought to obey In that case, G 2 t,T disappears alongside the path-dependent probability weights, culminating in λ opt u,t = (1 − γ) ξ u ; the approximation is exact under P = R for CRRA investors. For
On those grounds, letting P = R is sensible in consideration of approximation purposes. Table 1 of Brennan and Xia (2002) . We complement their baseline parameters by explicit values for λ u and φ u , that we set equal to the means of their counterparts λ and φ. More, note that ξ = 0 3 holds. We keep the benchmark planning horizons fixed at T = 5 and/or T = 10, as unambiguously indicated.
The prior proposition particularizes without regard to the in closed-form non-existent η L, * ∈ R + and λ L, * u,t ∈ R, an analytically tractable approximation to the optimal portfolio rules concealed in an application of Corollary 5.1 to the economy at hand.
51 To avoid numerical optimization approaches in an attempt to identify these controls, we may utilize the rules (5.22) in the sense of proj A P X 0
. Then, we insert the controls of Corollary 5.2 into the one above for full identification. Compared with proj A P X 0 , wherefore
must provoke the optimal primal controls, we discern the potential numerical burden, cf. section 4.2. Subsequently, we compare the two approaches. In either case, we arrive at closed-form expressions for the optimal portfolio composition, which accompany lower and upper bounds, J L,opt and J U,opt on the optimal value function. The gap, D R θ L, * t , θ U, * t , ensues easily and the harmonious CV must be determined numerically, see section 4.2.
Main Numerical Results
We progress by assessing the performance of the approximate method in the preceding economy for P = R and dual CRRA individuals on the basis of a couple of numerical examples. Towards this end, we put the benchmark parameter input as reported in Brennan and Xia (2002) to use. Tangibly, Table 1 records these benchmark values. The results appearing in this subsection arise as a consequence of N = 10, 000 simulated paths for time increments ∆t i = 0.05 as part of an Euler scheme, such that M = T /0.05. We consider two planning horizons, T = 5 and T = 10, because the therein inherently visible patterns carry over to extensions of these terminal dates. In addition to that, we study three dual 51 For financial intuition applicable to the previous two corollaries, see the analysis around Corollary 5.1. price from the primal and the dual (resp.). The lower bounds materialize from inserting θ U, * t into the primal objective. The results rely on N = 10, 000 paths for ∆t i = 0.05 time-steps, and X 0 = 1. The set (γ d , γ u ) ∈ {(5, 5) , (10, 2) , (15, 3)} abbreviated by {γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 } comprises the dual CRRA risk-profiles.
CRRA investors whose risk-profiles conform to (γ d , γ u ) ∈ {(5, 5) , (10, 2) , (15, 3)} for a benchmark level and endowment equally identified with K = X 0 = 1. The first element of the previous set mirrors the preferences of a standard CRRA agent, which we include for the sake of a validity check. That is to say, the approximation is exact for CRRA individuals, from where D R θ L, * t , θ U, * t = 0 must modulo numerical errors hold. For the remaining two investors, their risk-profiles diverge in form of the coefficients of risk-aversion which leads to inexact approximations: D R θ L, * t , θ U, * t > 0 ought to be true.
52 Lastly, in opposition to Bick et al. (2013) , we do not simulate the upper bound J U (X 0 ) in order to preclude estimations biases concerning the compensating variations. Rather, we utilize the analytical bound to emphasize the method's accuracy. Table 2 resumes the lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function attributable to the approximating mechanism in Section 4.2, as well as the homologous compensating variations and annual welfare losses in basis points (bp) of the initial endowment; the "naive" and true procedures engender identical outcomes, wherefore we also present the optimal parameters. 53 We addedly accompany the estimated lower bounds with their agreeable 95% confidence intervals. Preferably, these confidence bands occlude the upper bound, inasmuch as J L (X 0 ) in (4.8) outlines a point estimate. Table 2 in total gives a strong indication of our technique being near-optimal. Notably, the duality gaps vary from 0.001 for the T = 5 CRRA agent to 0.002 in regard to the T = 10, γ 3 dual CRRA agent. Apart from these negligible differences, the confidence intervals enfold the upper . Probability density horizon wealth. The figure displays the probability density functions of the optimal and the "naively" approximated near-optimal terminal real wealth associated with (resp.) an isoelastic agent and a dual CRRA agent. The coefficients of risk-aversion adhere to γ = 5 and (γ d , γ u ) = (10, 2) for the (resp.) CRRA and dual CRRA investors. The benchmark reads K = 1 (vertically dotted line). Both densities emanate from kernel density estimation with a bandwidth equal to 0.15 in application to the simulated wealth equation (4.8), based on T = 5 for N = 10, 000 with M = 100.
bounds, alluding in unison to accuracy. Economically quantifying the degree of these gaps' width, we observe that the breadth of the compensating variations and especially the annual welfare losses ratify this statement on the question of precision. The sizes of the annual welfare losses concretely range between 1.664 bp for the T = 5 CRRA individual to 4.600 bp for the T = 10, γ 2 dual CRRA agent. 54 If we follow the interpretation of "AL" as a representative investor's annual management fee, the exiguity of these quantities is apparent. Furthermore, the insignificant optimality gaps for the CRRA investor verify the method's legitimacy. On a final note, the impalpable dissimilarities between θ L, * t and θ U, * t jointly with identical performance make the numerical effort redundant. We note that the CV's and confidence intervals increase with T . However, the AL's remain unaffected, which suggests annual stability in the method's performance. Intuitively, the aberration of the approximate x t from the true x opt t is subjected to an extended stream of z u,t for higher T and thus accumulates more outwardly for expanded T . Table 2 furthermore reveals that besides the size of the dissimilitude in levels of risk-aversion, the individual magnitudes of γ d and γ u affect the approximation's potency. Observe that the risk-profile of γ 3 is quantitatively more widespread than that of γ 2 , whereas the approximation to x opt t is moderately more accurate for γ 3 . The overall coefficients 54 From this perspective, these annual welfare losses construe the mere meaningful touchstones, because of their practical and financial pertinence, along with the dissimilarity in the planning horizons.
of risk-aversion comprised within the γ 3 profile outweighing those within the γ 2 profile exemplify the necessary nuance to the rule. Leastwise, Corollaries 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrate that the piecewise variety of the rules abates with boosts in the risk-profiles as a whole. Hence, x opt t for the γ 3 agent are less sensitive to economic shocks, making the constant approximation to λ opt u,t more eloquent. Lastly, in Figure 3 , we depict the densities for X T /Π T of the CRRA and dual CRRA agents. The right-skewed nature of the latter shows that the dual CRRA function invokes a rough guarantee near the desired benchmark.
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Conclusion
This paper has proposed and assessed a computationally tractable method based on closedform expressions allowing us to near-optimally approximate portfolio weights in imperfect environments that populate finite-horizon investors with non-trivial preferences. The procedure evades the unexceptional absence of analytical formulae in such circumstances by projecting the optimal closed-form portfolio composition in an artificial market onto the admissible region whilst confining the shadow prices to some suitable parametric family. As a consequence, the technique obtains explicit identities for the investments decisions that mimic the truly optimal rules up to the shadow prices.
Optimality gaps unique to this method emerge as a result of convex duality and serve as concise evaluators of the technique's accuracy. We have accordingly tested the method in a model that accommodates unspanned inflation risk and occupies an agent with ratio dual CRRA preferences. Insignificant gaps and annual welfare losses varying between 1 and 5 basis points for different investors suggest precision of the method, cf. section 4. The general mechanism, cf. sections 3 and 4, is notwithstanding the studied illustration applicable under investment constraints to a more far-reaching class of models that admittedly encompass non-Markovian dynamics and state-dependent preferences.
X ∈ V if there exists an A : U → W that satisfies in addition to Az W ≤ M z U the following
for some M ∈ R + and all z ∈ U . The Fréchet derivative at hand reads D X F = A.
Secondly, let us turn to the Malliavin calculus. The next theorem embodies the Clark-Ocone formula Theorem A.1 (Clark-Ocone). Suppose that F : C 0 ([0, T ]) → R satisfies F ∈ D 1,2 . Then,
Specifically regarding martingales, (A.3) furnishes an adequate tool to uniquely identify the integrand in their martingale representation. Ultimately, the next theorem introduces the Skorokhod operator. 
Observe that these results hold for functionals on the Wiener space as countoured in the main text For proofs, consider Chapter 4.41 of Rogers and Williams (2000) or section 1.3.3 of Nualart (2006) .
